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Abstract:
I argue that social-contract theory cannot succeed because reasonable people may always
disagree, and that social-contract theory is irrelevant to the problem of the legitimacy
of a form of government or of a system of moral rules. I note the weakness of the ap-
peal to implicit agreement, the conﬂation of legitimacy with stability, the undesirability
of ‘public justiﬁcation’ and the apparent blindness to the evolutionary critical-rationalist
approach of Hayek and Popper. I employ that approach to sketch answers to the theoret-
ical, historical and practical questions about the legitimacy of government or of systems
of moral rules.
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1. Introduction
Social-contract theories of the legitimacy of government, or of a society-wide
system of moral rules, are enduringly popular. That is a puzzling fact because
• social-contract theories cannot solve the problem they are intended to
solve,
• that problem can be solved in a more straightforward manner,
• it is surprising that social-contract theorists cannot see both those things.
In section 2, I explain why social-contract theory cannot succeed. In section 3,
I explain why social contract theory is redundant. In section 4, I comment on
some infelicities in some contributions by social-contract theorists to the current
debate. In section 5, I outline an alternative approach which draws on the evolu-
tionary and critical-rationalist approaches of Friedrich Hayek and Karl Popper
(whose outlooks are very similar), but I do not discuss Hayek’s own penchant
for social-contract theory, which is irreconcilable with his evolutionary view. In
section 6, I conclude.
Henceforward, I usually leave the qualiﬁcation ‘society-wide’ implicit when
I speak of systems of moral rules. Throughout I assume that moral theories
are objectively true or false and that there are objective facts about what spe-
ciﬁc agents ought to do in particular circumstances, though I deny that we can
ever know for certain which moral propositions are true. I leave it to the moralSocial Contract Theory Should Be Abandoned 179
subjectivist, non-cognitivist or anti-realist to reformulate my criticisms of social-
contract theory in her own terms.
2. Social-Contract Theory Cannot Succeed
The point of social-contract theory is to show that a form of government or a
broader system of moral rules and institutions is legitimate and therefore ought
to be obeyed or complied with. If a set of free, adult individuals made a contract
with each other to accept a form of government or a system of moral rules, then,
at least barring unusual circumstances, that form of government or set of rules
would be legitimate for those people, who would be morally obliged to honour
their agreement. However, that is not the way that governments or society-wide
systems of moral rules come into being. The social-contract theorist realises
that. He proposes that a form of government or system of moral rules is legiti-
mate for a group of people if and only if, under favourable conditions, everyone
in the group would (provided he is reasonable) agree to be subject to that form
of government or that system of moral rules.
Thus, social-contract theories require that a proposition of the following form
is non-vacuously true:
(SC) necessarily, all reasonable persons under condition C will agree
that p.
The condition represented by ‘C’ is some favoured condition, such as being be-
hind a veil of ignorance or being impartial. The proposition represented by ‘p’ is
a complex proposition afﬁrming that everyone in the society should comply with
a speciﬁc form of government or a particular system of moral rules (or, perhaps,
any one of a set of such forms or systems, but I ignore that complication here,
since it makes no difference to my argument). The qualiﬁcation ‘necessarily’
indicates that the universally-quantiﬁed conditional that follows it holds coun-
terfactually. Without that modal qualiﬁcation, (SC) would be vacuously true due
to the falsity of its antecedent, if no reasonable person happened, in fact, to be
under condition C. I offer no account here of the kind of necessity involved. A
proposition of the form (SC) is vacuously true if and only if the description for
which ‘C’ does duty speciﬁes either an impossible condition or the fact that all
reasonable people agree that p, where ‘p’ represents the same proposition as
does ‘p’ in (SC).
However, it seems clear that no proposition of the form (SC) is non-vacuously
true. The reason is that reasonable persons are distinguished by their criti-
cal rationality, which means that it is, in principle, rationally open to them
to question, criticise or deny any proposition. What makes critical rational-
ity reasonable is that persons are thoroughly fallible: for all they can know,
the beliefs, views or theories they have so far acquired may be mistaken (Pop-
per, 1972[1957], 49–52; see also my 2013, section 3). These include not only all180 Danny Frederick
empirical propositions but even one-time supposed self-evident truths of math-
ematics and logic. For instance, Gottlob Frege thought he could derive all of
arithmetic from self-evident axioms of logic, but Bertrand Russell showed that
one of Frege’s axioms was self-contradictory (Russell 1959, 58–59; Whitehead
and Russell 1927, 59); and in contemporary logic all the traditional logical laws
have been impugned, as a means to resolving serious logical problems, by com-
petent logicians at leading research institutions (Priest and Thomason 2007,
96–98). If even the law of non-contradiction can be doubted or denied by reason-
able people under the best available conditions, it seems that there can be no
proposition which could be represented by ‘p’ to render (SC) non-vacuously true.
3. Social-Contract Theory Is Redundant
We should not be troubled by the fact that social-contract theory cannot succeed,
because social-contract theory is redundant.
Why should the social-contract theorist think that the legitimacy of a form of
government or of a system of moral rules depends upon the hypothetical agree-
ment of those who are subject to them? An answer seems to be disclosed in
the following thought of David Hume (1888[1739–40], 556): “Nothing is more
advantageous to society than such an invention [i.e., government]; and this in-
terest is sufﬁcient to make us embrace it with ardour and alacrity.” Ignoring the
complication that several forms of government, or systems of rules, may meet
the interests of individuals equally well, we might express Hume’s thought as
follows:
(a) the form of government or system of moral rules in question best serves
the interests of the individuals who make up the community,
therefore,
(b) necessarily, every reasonable member of the community will (under
favourable conditions) agree to be subject to it.
It should be observed that (b) is a proposition of the form of (SC). It should be
clear that (b) does not follow from (a), since reasonable individuals are such that
• they can easily be mistaken about
– their interests (it may take a lifetime of trial and error to discover
what one’s interests are)1
– the interests of others
– what social arrangements will best serve those interests (which is the
subject of ongoing social-scientiﬁc research),
• some of them (for example, some kinds of environmentalists) might not
wish to act in the best interests of themselves or of the individuals who
make up the (human) community.
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However, what is curious is why the fallacious transition to (b) is made at all.
For, surely, if (a) is true, then the form of government or system of moral rules
in question is legitimate and the members of the community ought to comply
with it. Thus, not only is (b) false and not a consequence of (a); it is entirely
unnecessary for the argument for the legitimacy of government or of a system of
moral rules. All that is required for that purpose is an argument for (a). Appeal
to a hypothetical social contract is otiose as well as cack-handed.
Propositions of the form (a) are contingent. Whether or not a particular form
of government or system of moral rules best serves the interests of the indi-
viduals who make up a given community depends upon the peculiarities of the
environment they inhabit. Further, keeping the environment constant, differing
forms of government or systems of moral rules may be appropriate for communi-
ties containing differently constituted persons (humans, Martians or whatever).
However, it seems a moral truth, and plausibly a necessary one, that:
(c) the form of government or system of moral rules which best serves the
interests of the individuals who make up a given community in a given
environment is legitimate for that community in that environment.
Some theorists may be reluctant to leave behind (b) in favour of (c) because of
fears about authoritarianism or paternalism (see, for example, Sugden 2013, 61–
62). If we accept that a form of government or system of rules can be legitimate
for a community even though some (perhaps many) people in that community
reject it, it may seem that we will be led to accept that all manner of schemes
may be imposed on the community, in the face of opposition, in the name of
the general good or the dissenters’ own good. However, that is not so—at least,
in the case of human persons—because the separateness of human persons, in
conjunction with their fallibility and capacity for critical rationality, means that
their interests are best served by having a right to direct their own lives (see my
forthcoming, section 4), which must therefore be recognised in any legitimate
form of government or system of moral rules.
4. Social-Contract Infelicities
Robert Sugden seems to be offering an alternative to the usual hypothetical
agreement of social-contract theory when, following Hume, he suggests that po-
litical institutions and moral norms that obtain in a society may be legitimised
through implicit rather than explicit agreement. Such implicit agreement
“rests on a general sense of common interest; each member of society
has this sense and is aware that the others have it too [...] the idea
of mutual advantage is an essential part [...] a convention is a mu-
tually beneﬁcial practice that is generally followed in a society; each
individual is motivated to follow it both by interest and by a sense of182 Danny Frederick
justice; but both motivations are conditional on the expectation that
others will follow the practice too.” (2103, 65–66)
However, if an ‘implicit agreement’ does not mean the same as a hypothetical
agreement, as in (SC), it seems it must mean an agreement (albeit implicit) be-
tween all people in the society in actual circumstances, which is even less plau-
sible than propositions of the form (SC). It is not the case that everyone actually
agrees that government is better than anarchy; and even if we pretend that they
do, we should acknowledge that they disagree as to whether the existing form
of government, or the prevailing system of moral rules, is legitimate. Similar
objections apply to the attempt of Peter Vanderschraaf (2013) to understand the
relationship between ruler and ruled as an implicit contractual relationship.
A more useful notion of ‘implicit agreement’, which will be the one employed
henceforward, is illustrated by an example given by Anthony de Jasay:
“Consider the case of two men Will and John who both want to cross
a river. Will has a boat and John has a pair of oars. I believe they
would without further ado get into the boat and row across without
previous agreement about taking turns at rowing and the fee John
would pay Will for using the boat and Will would pay John for using
the oars.” (2013, 56)
Such implicit agreements, depending on unspoken mutual acknowledgement,
are possible only for a small number of people in proximity to each other. They
therefore seem unsuitable for the social-contract theorist, who needs a society-
wide agreement to moral norms. It seems true that a moral norm implicitly
agreed in a small group may spread throughout a society by means of chains of
such implicit agreements between members of different small groups. However,
unfortunately for the social-contract theorist, the society-wide norm thereby pro-
duced would not be one that is implicitly agreed by all. For example, if an
implicit agreement to behave in some reciprocal fashion has been established
within one small group, some of the members of that group may establish a
similar agreement in their dealings with some members of another small group.
Those members of that other small group may then go on to extend the norm by
implicit agreement within their group; and then other members of that group
may spread the norm to another group by implicit agreement with the members
of that group with whom they deal; and so on. Through such chains of unspoken
mutual acknowledgement a common moral norm could be established through-
out a great society. However, it would not be the case that all the members of
the society have agreed with each other, implicitly, that the moral norm should
obtain in the society. No one has made an implicit agreement with anyone but
a small number of people. Indeed, it would be possible for some people, even
for everyone in the society, to insist that the norm should not govern the whole
of society, even while they are keen to retain it for their interactions with the
small number of people with whom they deal. For, each may hold that, while
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whatever), it is quite inappropriate for some other types who inhabit the same
society. The norm may thus be recognised by all as an existing society-wide
moral norm established by implicit agreements, even though many in the so-
ciety do not agree that it is a legitimate society-wide moral norm. A chain of
implicit agreements to the same moral norm, even where that chain spreads the
norm throughout a society, does not amount to a society-wide agreement to the
norm holding society-wide.
Gerald Gaus defends the transition from (a) to (b) as follows:
“[I]t is not enough to show that such [common social] norms are in
the interests of all; a person must not only conform to a moral norm,
but internalize it, feel guilt, experience the reactive attitudes of re-
sentment and indignation, and be prepared to sanction those who
violate it.” (2013, 76)
That appears to confuse different questions. What makes a form of govern-
ment or a system of moral rules legitimate is that there is no better alternative
possible way of securing the interests of all. A separate question, to which mat-
ters such as conformity, internalisation and sanctions are pertinent, is what it
takes to make a system of moral rules (including those pertaining to govern-
ment) stable over time. However, even with regard to the latter question, (b)
is not required. It is sufﬁcient if enough of the populace think that the form of
government or system of moral rules is legitimate. After all, we can expect every
society to have its radicals and anarchists.
Indeed, it would be a bad thing if everyone did internalise the prevailing
system of moral rules, at least in a developed society in which rules are codiﬁed
and legislated. Such a society, if it is to be capable of adapting its form of govern-
ment or system of moral rules to changed circumstances, or in the light of new
knowledge about unchanged circumstances, will have, from time to time, some
members who propose novel changes to the existing forms, thereby disagreeing
with those of their fellows who still endorse the current arrangements. In such
a society, disagreement over the current form of government or system of moral
rules is a condition of adaptation and of progress. Thus, it is not only highly
unlikely, but also highly undesirable, that we should ever achieve what Gaus
calls “public justiﬁcation”, that is, “the public knowledge that a stable practice
is morally acceptable to all the participants” (2013, 80).
Gaus eschews the view that he labels “The Moral Autonomy Conviction”
(2013, 73), or “the MAC”, for short. On the MAC:
• “[e]ach competent moral agent [...] properly arrives at her own judgment
as to what MORALITY requires [...] and this judgment does not neces-
sarily refer to any collective determination” (Gaus 2013, 73);
• the agent has “no need to have her judgments conﬁrmed by others; if she
concludes that she has deliberated as well as she can, and that she is
justiﬁed in believing that IT [i.e., MORALITY] requires f, then that is
what she proclaims, and so, in the name of IT, she concludes that all must
f” (Gaus 2013, 74).184 Danny Frederick
The problem with the MAC, says Gaus, is that it sees morality as a personal
norm, though one that purports to direct all. But “a society in which most have
this, and only this, conception of morality, will ﬁnd it exceedingly difﬁcult to
adopt common social norms, for they require a collective determination of what
rules are to be internalized, when I can expect others (or myself) to express guilt
and remorse, and when I expect others (or myself) to be sanctioned” (2013, 76).
Gaus, mistakenly, wants to spell out this ‘collective determination’ in terms of a
social contract.
There are at least two problems with the MAC. First, the MAC seems to claim
that the competent moral agent accepts any moral proposition only as a conse-
quence of her own rational evaluation. That claim seems to be absurd because
a rational evaluation would involve considering reasons pro and con; and such
reasons would themselves be propositions which the agent has accepted; but
if the agent’s acceptance of these propositions in turn must be a consequence
of the agent’s own rational evaluation, then the agent is involved in a vicious
inﬁnite regress. The fact is that most of the propositions we accept (including
the moral ones) are not propositions we have accepted as a consequence of ra-
tional evaluation but are rather inherited biologically or culturally and are, in
that sense, products of ‘collective determination’. However, there is no require-
ment that, if we are reasonable, we will all agree on these inherited views. Our
critical rationality enables us to stand back from any of our inherited views,
criticise them and, sometimes, replace them with better ones, even though, in
this process of rational appraisal, we inescapably make use of other inherited
views which are the result of biological or cultural evolution (Hayek 1967[1963],
60–63; 1978[1970]; Popper 1972[1949], 131–32; 1994b, 134–39).
Second, and somewhat tangentially, while one who recognises that reason-
able persons are critically rational need not accept the mistaken notions that
judgements or beliefs can be “conﬁrmed” or “justiﬁed” (Popper 1983, 18–34),
she will insist that knowledge is social, not only because it depends on theo-
ries which are products of species and societal evolution, but also because the
part of that knowledge that results from rational evaluation depends upon inter-
subjective criticism and testing (Popper 1945, chapter 23). An agent’s rational
evaluation of a proposition must survive the severest criticism of her intellec-
tual adversaries before it can count as knowledge; though the process of inter-
subjective criticism may involve the agent responding to criticism by criticising
it, or by modifying her view in ways which increase its explanatory value, rather
than by simply giving up her view (Popper 1959, sections 19-20). So, whereas
the MAC may encourage “each person to claim the status of the truth giver [...]
[and thus] to invite civil conﬂict” (Gaus 2013, 74), the recognition of our capac-
ity for critical rationality encourages each person to co-operate in learning from
others while retaining her independent initiative.
Jan Narveson appears to claim that, in order to show that government, or a
moral rule, is legitimate, “[w]e need to show each person that that person could
expect to gain, in the sense of expecting an improvement as measured by that
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to the same rule” (2013, 89). That claim seems false. It would be sufﬁcient for us
to show that the rule would beneﬁt each individual better than any alternative
rule, whether or not each individual can see that we have shown it. We might
have to convince each individual of the truth of what we have shown if we had
to obtain the agreement of each individual to the rule before she complied with
it. That would be the situation of separate individuals coming together to form
an association (a club, for instance). However, any such individuals are already
members of a society, through membership of which each has been inducted in a
system of moral rules without ever having agreed to that system of moral rules.
Of course, any of those rules is, in principle, open to question by the critically
rational individual; but in the meantime that individual will for the most part
comply with those rules out of habit.
5. Sketch of an Alternative
The problem of the legitimacy of government or of a system of moral rules has a
theoretical, a historical and a practical aspect. I consider these in turn.
The theoretical question is:
(q1) what, if any, form of government, or system of moral rules, is
legitimate for a community of individuals of type I in an envi-
ronment of type E?
Given (c), the answer depends upon which form or system “best serves the inter-
ests of the individuals who make up the community”. The quoted phrase needs
spelling out, and different theorists will spell it out in different ways. Given any
sufﬁciently detailed spelling out, the answer to (q1) becomes a matter for the so-
cial sciences, and thus revisable in the light of new social-scientiﬁc knowledge.
The results of the social sciences may also be brought to bear on some of the the-
oretical disputes between alternative detailed speciﬁcations of the notion, best
serves the interests of the individuals who make up the community, since it is,
at least in part, a factual matter what is in the best interests of a person of a
particular type. It should therefore be possible to evaluate rival answers to (q1)
in terms of empirical and explanatory adequacy, as well as in other ways.
Given speciﬁed types I and E, the legitimate form of government, or system
of moral rules, will be that identiﬁed by the true answer to (q1) for those types.
However, each of the rival answers to (q1) which we produce will be a theory
which, given our thoroughgoing fallibility, we cannot know for certain to be true.
Even if, for speciﬁed types I and E, we manage to obtain a theory which answers
(q1) and which is far superior to its rival theories, it is always possible that, in
future, an even better theory will be proposed; and, indeed, theorists should be
encouraged to ﬁnd better alternatives even to our best theories. In consequence,
we will never be in a position to say for sure which form of government, or system
of moral rules, is legitimate. The best we can do is to keep improving on our186 Danny Frederick
current theories. We start with the answers that we have; we try to improve
them; and within that context we try to ﬁnd better ones. If we ever ﬁnd ourselves
in a position where everyone not only agrees which theory is currently best,
but also accepts that theory as true (instead of searching for a better one), our
epistemic task will be to stimulate the disagreement, and thus the search for
alternatives, on which the growth of knowledge depends (Popper 1945, chapter
23; 1983, 67–71; 1994a).
The historical question is:
(q2) how could it come about that the majority, perhaps the vast ma-
jority, of the members of a society view the form of government
or the system of moral rules under which they live as legiti-
mate?
We know that forms of government and systems of moral rules have not been
introduced by explicit agreement of all who are subject to them. However, we
noted in section 4 that small-scale norms introduced by implicit agreement can
spread to become society-wide norms that no one agreed to (either explicitly
or implicitly). There is also a tradition in economics of explaining how society-
wide norms can evolve as the unintended by-products of actions which had other
aims, in Ferguson’s famous phrase, “the result of human action but not the exe-
cution of any human design” (1782, 205). Such evolutionary processes can result
in society-wide norms, such as the use of gold as a common medium of exchange,
even though none of the barter exchanges from which the regularity evolved
involved any implicit agreement on a common medium of exchange (Menger
2007[1871], 257–62).2 However, evolved society-wide norms, as we noted in sec-
tion 4, need not be acceptable as norms to all, or even to most. What explains
the fact that mere regularities of social behaviour can come to be seen by most
members of the society as legitimate moral norms is that people are not only
rule-following creatures, but are also rule-seeking creatures; and, speciﬁcally,
they are inherently on the lookout for moral norms. Just as our inborn tendency
to search for laws of nature helps us to satisfy our need to make sense of the
natural world (Popper 1972[1957], 42–48), so our inborn tendency to search for
moral laws helps us to satisfy our need to make sense of the social world, and
it predisposes us to hypothesise that existing social regularities are legitimate
moral norms (though we hold such hypotheses open to criticism and testing in-
sofar as we are critically rational).
The practical question is:
(q3) how do we bring it about that we live under a legitimate form
of government or a legitimate system of moral rules?
2 Hillel Steiner (2013) criticises accounts of the greater efﬁciency of money payments over barter
which assume contemporary decision theory; but, contra his ﬁnal sentence, his criticism does not
seem to impugn Menger’s account of how money evolves out of barter transactions, since that
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The general approach to answering (q3) is similar to that taken in answering
(q1): we start with what we have, we try to improve it, and within that context
we try to think up new ways of doing things that are better. Our theories giv-
ing answers to (q1) will be our guide in identifying improvements to our current
systems of government and morals. However, the debate over the practical ques-
tion, (q3), will be of interest not only, or even primarily, to theorists. All sorts
of ‘practical people’ whose interest in theory, or in epistemic virtue, is minimal
or non-existent, will be keenly interested in bringing about or blocking changes
to current systems of government and morals; and they may indeed be reason-
able in pursuing their non-epistemic ends. So, even if all the theorists agree on
which answer to (q1) is currently best, and even if they all accept that answer
as true (instead of seeking alternatives to it), they can expect to meet disagree-
ment of diverse sorts from many non-theorists. However, not only is unanimous
agreement among reasonable people with regard to (q3) not to be expected; it is
not needed in order to bring about substantial change in existing moral norms
and institutions. The best we can do to move in the direction of a form of gov-
ernment or system of moral rules that is legitimate, is to make use of existing
institutional arrangements, sympathetic organised interests and available tech-
niques of persuasion to bring about changes, in accord with our favoured answer
to (q1), that a signiﬁcant proportion of the population (perhaps a majority) do
not agree with. That is doubtless trite; but who has a better alternative to offer?
Not the social-contract theorist, whose offering seems irrelevant to (q3), as well
as to (q2) and (q1).
6. Conclusion
Social-contract theory is intended as a solution to the problem of what makes
a government or a system of moral rules legitimate. It cannot solve the prob-
lem because reasonable people are critically rational: they are always rationally
entitled to disagree. Further, the problem can be solved without social-contract
theory by invoking the interests of the members of society. Social-contract the-
ory should therefore be abandoned.
An account of the social contract in terms of implicit agreements cannot work
because even a society-wide chain of small-scale implicit agreements to the same
norm does not add up to a society-wide agreement that the norm is legitimate
society-wide. Some social-contract theorists seem to mix up the question of le-
gitimacy with the question of stability; but even stability does not require the
agreement of all reasonable people. An approach which I have suggested may
solve that problem is to combine an account of the evolution of social regulari-
ties with the human propensity to look for moral norms in their attempt to make
sense of social reality. However, it would not be a good thing if everyone viewed
the existing form of government or system of moral rules as legitimate, because188 Danny Frederick
progress in morals and politics, as in other areas of knowledge, depends upon
disagreement.
When it comes to the matter of how we improve our institutions or rules to
get them closer to those we think legitimate, social-contract theory has nothing
useful to say.
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